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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERILS OF
MODERATION: THE CASE
OF THE BOY SCOUTS
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

Oftentimes it is tricky business to predict decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in close cases. In recent times, perhaps, that task has
been somewhat easier because of the five-to-four split in the Court that has
characterized many of its decisions on federalism I and the Commerce
Clause.2 But it was something of a surprise that the Court's recent decision
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale3 reinforced this ever-hardening divide,
and perhaps even more notable that the five conservative justices arguably
slipped again into activist mode by holding that the Boy Scouts had a First
Amendment right of "expressive association" that allowed them to exclude
an avowed homosexual from their ranks. The casualty in this case was
New Jersey's "Law Against Discrimination," at least insofar as it forbade
the Scouts from discriminating against Dale on grounds of his sexual
orientation.4
Dale gains significance because of the bluntness with which it
presents the central question: Is the Boy Scouts within its First Amendment
right to dismiss an adult troop leader solely because he is an avowed
homosexual? Stated in a nutshell, this case presents a classic conflict
between two principles of the highest import. On the one side stands the
freedom of expression, including the freedom of association to express, as
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law
School; member of the University of Southern California Law School faculty, 1968-1972. I sbould like
to thank David Strauss, Geoffrey Stone, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments on an earlier draft of
this article, and Robert Alt for his able research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. CL 1740 (2000).
3. 120 S. C. 2446 (2000).
4.

NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -49 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
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enshrined in the First Amendment. 5 On the other side stands freedom from
discrimination, including, most emphatically, discrimination by other
private parties, as embodied in the various civil rights laws that populate
our statute books. Freedom of association, in speech as elsewhere, requires
that people be free to associate, or not associate, with others, no questions
asked. Freedom from discrimination requires that private individuals and
groups exclude from their decisionmaking calculus those characteristics
that are held irrelevant by the state. In a regime of freedom of association,
all agreements require unanimous consent, and any individual can withhold
consent at will. Under a regime of freedom from discrimination, refusal to
deal may be arbitrary, but it cannot be for those reasons declared illegal by
statute. The Constitution accords both rights the highest status. Strict
scrutiny is the norm for statutes that limit the freedom of expressive
association. A compelling state interest is said to exist in eliminating all
discrimination, public or private. The irresistible force inevitably collides
with the immovable object. In this case the new activist wing of the
Supreme Court held that the principle of freedom of association was an
immovable object, while the dissenters found the antidiscrimination
principle an irresistible force-or at least a compelling state interest.
As a matter of outcomes I think that the majority reached the right
decision. But its grounds for decision were too narrow. Any constitutional
imperative worth its salt has to occupy a large portion of the legal terrain.
But constitutional acreage, like all territories, is a scarce resource that can
accommodate only a finite number of discrete principles. The right
outcome in this case should not depend on a delicate balance of what kinds
of organizations count as expressive organizations under the First
Amendment. Rather, any proper decision must recognize that the state has
no interest in counteracting discrimination by private associations that do
not possess monopoly power. The fine-spun efforts to shoehorn freedom
of association into some ill-defined expressive box will breed only
pointless and arcane distinctions. What must be recognized is that freedom
of association is "derivative" not only of speech, but also of liberty and
The upshot is that all private
property as ordinarily conceived.
associations, regardless of their internal structure and stated purposes,
should receive the same freedom afforded the Boy Scouts in this case.
5. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Freedom of association is
"among the preferred rights derived by implication from the first amendment's guarantees of spcech,
press, petition, and assembly." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1010 (2d ed.
1988).
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As a matter of basic theory, the outcome ought to differ only in those
cases where claims for freedom of association are asserted by firms or
institutions that occupy some monopoly position. Quite simply, the instinct
runs as follows. The monopolist leaves his customers with no choice save
that of doing without. To offset that powerful advantage, he is therefore
obliged to take all customers and to do so at reasonable and (perhaps)
nondiscriminatory rates. The precise rules of regulation are of course very
6
much up for grabs, and I have discussed some of these at length elsewhere.
The difficulty in this inquiry is the identification of those institutions
that possess a sufficient level of monopoly power to justify this deviation
from the general rule of freedom of association. Certain government
bodies clearly have that power because their monopoly is entrenched as a
matter of law. All citizens must clear customs through a governmentoperated facility, for example. Similarly, all individuals must obtain
permits to build homes or to cut down timber. On the private side,
however, it is harder today to find organizations that qualify as stable, longterm monopolists. In earlier times, common carriers and inns frequently
held that position. There could easily be only one stagecoach or railroad
that ran between two points, and only one inn on route at which to spend
the night. But the advance of technology has weakened these private
monopoly chokeholds. Air, bus, train, and livery service may supply
transportation between two points. Therefore, the element of monopoly
now may be found in those essential facilities that lie at the center of some
hub-and-spoke networks, whether they be for transportation or for
communication over the Internet. It may therefore be appropriate to
consider how these older regimes of regulation carry over to new contexts.
But whatever the precise contours of classical monopolies, it pushes
very hard to claim that the Boy Scouts occupies a monopoly position in the
market for dealing with youth. To be sure, it occupies a distinctive niche in
the marketplace, which helps explain its durability. But for each of the
activities it provides, it faces serious competition from a broad range of
institutions. Thousands of individuals and institutions offer summer camp
and after-school activities, for example, and the astute consumer could
easily decide to acquire the full range of child-centered services from a
wide range of charitable, religious, and private providers. The Boy Scouts
thus competes with everything from Little League Baseball to 4-H Clubs,
not to mention the possibility of other new entrants in any portion of its
6. For a discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN. PRINCIPLES FOR AFREE SOCIETY: RECOCIuNG
INDIVIDuAL LIBERTY wrrH THE COMMON GOOD 298-318 (1998).
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business. Even if the monopoly rules should apply to some network
industries, they hardly seem to apply in this context. Outside the context of
network industries, the greatest protection for all individuals lies not in a
coercive antidiscrimination law, but in institutional redundancy-the
ability for individuals to enter and exit a wide range of organizations as
they see fit.
Such then is the ultimate goal. The path by which I shall pursue it
starts with narrower matters. Part I gives a brief overview of the opinions
in this case. Part II disputes the proposition put forward by the Supreme
Court dissenters that expressive rights only belong to those who state clear
and unequivocal positions. Part III seeks to outline the correct relationship
between freedom of association and the nondiscrimination principle,
confining the latter as an antidote to individuals or organizations that have
monopoly power. Lastly, Part IV argues that the distinction between
expressive associations, which are protected, and nonexpressive
associations, which are not, is indefensible both as a matter of political
theory and constitutional law.
I. BACKGROUND
The dispute in Dale arose when the Boy Scouts decided to expel
James Dale from membership because he was an avowed homosexual. As
so often happens with test cases, the aggrieved party was the perfect
plaintiff. 7 By all other standards, Dale fit the bill of the model Scout. He
worked his way up through different Scout troops under the jurisdiction of
the Monmouth Council, starting at age eight as a Cub Scout in 1978 and
ending as an Eagle Scout (the highest scouting rank) in 1988. Along the
way he garnered some twenty-five merit badges. After finishing with the
Scouts, he became an adult member of the Scouts in 1989. While a student
at Rutgers University he recognized that he was gay and openly
acknowledged his homosexuality to family and friends. His story was
written up'in the Newark Star-Ledger. When it came to the attention of
Monmouth Council Scout Officials, Dale was asked to resign. That
decision was subsequently upheld by a Review Committee of the Northeast
Region. Dale thought it would be futile to appeal the decision to the
National Council, so he chose instead to challenge the expulsion decision
under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD), which provides in
part: "All persons shall have the opportunity... to obtain all the
7.

The facts of the case are summarized here from the majority opinion. See Dale, 120 S.Ct. at
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accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of
public accommodation .... without discrimination because of... affec-

tional or sexual orientation... ."8
The New Jersey Supreme Court gave the statute a broad reading to
effectuate its liberal remedial purposes. For starters, it rejected the Boy
Scouts' claim that it could not be classified "a place of public
accommodation" because it did not operate at any fixed location. That
determination was, of course, strictly one of statutory construction. It does
not raise any broad question of principle, for the statute could be easily
amended to include organizations as well as places of accommodation.
Indeed the New Jersey Court's somewhat jarring reading of the term "place
of public accommodation" may well be more in keeping vAth the
legislative intention than the rival interpretation9 that has also garnered
substantial support in the reading of other statutes.
The Scouts fared no better in trying to shoehorn its case into the
narrow exceptions allowing for discrimination under the LAD. More
specifically, after its sweeping definition of public place of
accommodation, the LAD contains three separate exemptions from the
general statutory command. The first reads, "nothing herein contained
shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club,
or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private."' 0 I
confess that I do not have an ideal interpretation of the phrase "distinctly
private." Distinctly private in this context could not cover all institutions
that were not owned by the state, for that reading would make hash of the
general sweep of the basic injunction, which is aimed at countless kinds of
private activities including "any tavern, roadhouse, hotel, motel, trailer
camp, summer camp, day camp, or resort camp," 11 and the list goes on.
Rather, the phrase has to refer to those private organizations that are, as the
Supreme Court intimated in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, highly

selective in their admissions and recruitment programs.' 2 The Boy Scouts
could not claim to be a "distinctively private" club or organization because
it did not exercise the requisite "selectivity" in choosing its membership.
8. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:54 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
9. For the opposite view that membership organizations do not come within the meaning of
"other place of exhibition or entertainment" under Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(a)-(b), see Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993). See also United
States Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.V.2d 450,454 (Ioa 1988) (same interpretation
under local statute).

10.

NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-50)(West 1993 & Supp. 2000).

11.
12.

Id.
468 U.S. 609,621 (1984).
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Similarly, the Boy Scouts was not an educational facility operated by a
bona fide religious or sectarian institution. The New Jersey Supreme Court
thus duly relegated this exception to the lowly status of "a narrowly drawn
statutory exclusion." 13 Finally, the Boy Scouts did not act in loco parentis:
After all, there are many issues, including those relating to sexuality, that
parents discuss with their children but the Boy Scouts as a matter of
principle does not. The LAD applied, and the statutory exceptions did not.
In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not, in my
view, make any bold departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent. In
Roberts, for example, the question before the United States Supreme Court
was whether to strike down on First Amendment grounds a Minnesota
statute that banned sex discrimination, once again in places of public
accommodation.' 4 In sustaining that statute, Justice Brennan was not
indifferent to the First Amendment claims of freedom of association, and
might well have allowed them to prevail if the Jaycees had been the right
kind of association to make the claim. However, the types of organizations
that received elevated First Amendment protection were limited. The
Jaycees (like the Boy Scouts) was not an intimate association to which
antidiscrimination laws could be made to apply only with difficulty. 15 In
addition, the Jaycees was found not to be an organization with a strong
expressive message that would be diluted or distorted by the application of
the antidiscrimination laws. Indeed, as a mainstream organization the
Jaycees lacked the militant philosophy that would be affronted by a
requirement to admit women into its ranks. At bottom, the Jaycees could
not overcome a form of behavioral estoppel. The "Jaycees already invites
women to share the group's views and philosophy and to participate in
much of its training and community activities." 16 The upshot there was
that any "claim that admission of women as full voting members will
impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are not
13. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1214 (N.J. 1999) (relying on the interpretation of
the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (Consol. 1995 & Supp. 2000), constredin
United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y.
1983)).
14. 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984).
15. As an aside, the question of intimate associations raises difficulties of its own. The
traditional "morals" head of the police power allowed for their regulation. Today, tho tendency is to
hold that these regulations are outside the power of the state, even as economic regulations, however illconceived, fall within that power. But even in the new synthesis, the antidiscrimination principle comes
out second best here. Even our Supreme Court would chafe at the idea that one person commits a
wrong when he or she refuses to marry another because of race, creed, or religion, let alone sexual
orientation.
16. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
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permitted to vote is attenuated at best." 17 The world is awash in balancing
tests. The state interest in eliminating discrimination in private organizations did not dim, so the balance was easy to draw. "We are persuaded,"
Justice Brennan concluded, "that Minnesota's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact
that application of the statute toIs the Jaycees may have on the male
members' associational freedoms."
The Supreme Court's decision in Dale did not overtly challenge the
conceptual framework established in Roberts; indeed, it self-consciously
purported to build on it. Through an adroit use of the balancing test, Chief
Justice Rehnquist came out the other way. He found that the First
Amendment interest in association was stronger in Dale than it was in
Roberts, and the state interest in applying its antidiscrimination law perhaps
was weaker.
On the first point, Rehnquist signaled his dissatisfaction with the New
Jersey insistence that the Boy Scouts "do not associate for the purpose of
disseminating the message that homosexuality is immoral."' 19 In his view,
"[a]n association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection." 20 Second, he refused to
probe the intensity with which the Boy Scouts held its particular beliefs.
For him it did not matter that the Boy Scouts equivocated on a position that
did not receive unanimous internal support, or that the organization was
willing to tolerate the defense of homosexual activities by heterosexual
Scouts. What he cared about, rightly in my view, was the sincerity of the
belief, without being troubled, as were the dissenting Justices and the New
Jersey Supreme Court, about either the internal coherence of its position or
the ardor with which it was advanced. "The fact that the organization does
not trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within
its ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment
The contrast between this sentence and the Brennan
protection."'"
quotations noted above surely signals, for better or worse, a substantial
departure from Roberts. Second, Rehnquist was evidently troubled by
17.

Id.

18.

ld. at623.

19.

Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454 (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of An., 734 A.2d 1196. 1223 (NJ.

1999)).
20.

Id. Rehnquist here relied on Hurley v. Irish-Amnerican Gay, Lesbian and BiserualGroup of

Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), to stand for the proposition that a St. Patrick's day parade was protected
even though its purpose "was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation." Dale. 120 S. Ct. at
2454.
21.

Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
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extending the idea of public accommodation to cover the Scouts. He thus
noted that, in its original conception, the term "public accommodation"
applied to inns and trains. It was then extended to cover places where the
public was expected to be invited, such as taverns, restaurants, retail shops,
and libraries. And finally it was, as construed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, extended to cover private operations that are not linked to any
particular place at all.22 Rehnquist clearly thought that the state interest in
protection against discrimination was not uniform across all these entities,
even if they were treated in the same fashion under state law. Thus, in
Dale, the First Amendment received greater weight, while the state interest
in combating private discrimination received less. The combined effect
was enough to overturn the statute.
For its part, the dissent by Justice Stevens closely followed the
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court. It is not hard to predict where
a Justice will come out when his opening salvo reads, "New Jersey 'prides
itself on judging each individual by his or her merits' and on being 'in the
vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of
all types from our society.' 2 3 With this perspective (or objective)
disclosed, Stevens essentially adopted the constitutional interpretation of
the New Jersey Supreme Court. The range of opinions certainly leaves
much room for commentary.
II. THE DANGERS OF PROBING DEEPLY
My first quarrel is with the New Jersey Supreme Court and the four
dissenters on the Supreme Court who followed its lead. The source of the
grievance is easy to state: In the course of their balancing test, these judges
have adopted a position that restricts the full protection for expressive
liberties only to those organizations that adopt extreme social positions. Of
course, this is something of an overstatement. I doubt that Justice Stevens
or anyone else thinks that our two mainstream parties are not allowed to
exclude individuals whose views do not square with their own.
Organizations that are in some sense solely devoted to political activities
gain from the purity of their mission some degree of freedom from
government control. But organizations like the Scouts and the Ku Klux
Klan do not have any single political function, and it is to this class of
organization that our analysis should be directed. The implications of the
22. lIaat 2455-56.
23. lMLat 2459 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389
A.2d 465,478 (NJ. 1978)).
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approach might offer some comfort to the Ku Klux Klan or to various hate
groups, only to play havoc with the position of mainstream institutions who
are now put to this unnecessary choice: voice extreme positions or choose
moderate ones and forfeit your right to manage your internal affairs. I have
no direct experience whatsoever with the Boy Scouts, but reading through
the record leads me to believe that the Boy Scouts offers a textbook
example of the dangers of any position that ties the level of constitutional
protection to the articulation of an organizational belief structure.
The Scouts is no penny-ante operation.
Started in 1910, the
organization has had over 87 million members during its lifetime; as of
1992, it had about four million youths and one million adults as active
members. 24 It has grown from about 4.3 million members in 1997 to
around 5 million members today.25 Natural attrition is a standing peril to
all such organizations. To avoid the erosion of this base, the Scouts
continuously utilizes intensive campaigns to recruit and retain its members.
The use of television and magazine advertisements, the organization of
well-conceived drives to attract new members, the collaborations with a
wide range of civic organizations, and even the wearing of the Scouts'
uniform in public places all help extend its membership base. In looking at
this membership, the New Jersey Supreme Court got matters partially right
when it noted that "[the Scouts'] success in attracting members is at least
partly attributable to its long-standing commitment to a diverse and
'representative' membership, as well as its aggressive recruitment through
26
national television, radio, and magazine campaigns."
Consistent with the demands of its broad membership base, the Boy
Scouts' general philosophy is a model of diffidence, evasion, and restraint.
It contains a broad list of general nostrums that right-thinking people would
find hard to deny (and, all too often, hard to keep). Thus, Scout Law
requires scouts to be Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly, Courteous,
Kind, Obedient, Cheerful, Thrifty, Brave, Clean and Reverent.2 7 The
Scout's Oath does require Scouts to be "morally straight," but here straight
24.

Id. at 2476.

25.

Andrew Jacobs, Victory Has Consequencesof Its Otn, N.Y. T1DMEs, June 29, 2000, at A28

(noting that the Boy Scouts risks a backlash for ousting Dale from its membership).
26. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1200-01 (NJ. 1999).
27. Id.at 1202. The Scout Oath reads in full:
On my honor I will do my best

To do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law;
To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.
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is not in opposition to gay, but means only "[t]o be a person of strong
character, [and to] guide your life with honesty, purity, and justice."2 It is
easy to attack this general prescription as yet another empty moral bromide
devoid of substantive content, and to argue that the Scouts is guilty of an
opportunistic ex post reconstruction of its own principles and policies when
it claims in litigation that the term "morally straight" contains an implied
condemnation of homosexual behavior. It is also easy to assert that the
Scouts cannot have strong principles for internal guidance when it refuses
to espouse any single religion and insists on its own nonsectarian nature by
holding that "[r]eligious instruction is the responsibility of the home and
church."2 9 Likewise the Scouts looks weak, diffident, and slightly
Victorian on matters of sexuality, when it only endorses two propositions:
(1) "for the followers of most religions, sex should take place only between
married couples"; and (2) the Scouts does not formally discuss matters of
sexuality, because the organization "believes that boys should learn about
sex and family life from their parents, consistent with their spiritual
beliefs." 3 It makes sense for the Boy Scouts to adopt a strategy of soft
avoidance on sex education for the young. If there is no consensus on how
it should be done by the Scouts, then it is better to give the issue a low
profile within the organization, at least as a matter of explicit statement in
fundamental Scout Law.
This same wimpy, middle-of-the road outlook is reflected in other
portions of the Scouts' credo. The Scouts is nondenominational because it
does not wish to drive away Catholics and Jews, or perhaps it is Mormons
and Southern Baptists, or perhaps Methodists and Episcopalians. As an
outsider, I could not hazard a guess as to which faction of the Scouts is
tolerant of which other faction; probably there is a commendable reciprocity in the spirit of cooperation. That said, a sappy nondenominationalism may serve the Scouts as a global organization far better than any
hard-edged dogma or creed. Any close alliance with one religion will drive
away believers in other faiths.
In light of the demands on its organization, no one should think for a
second that the Scouts' bland declarations represent a lack of
understanding, conviction, or foresight. Rather, they represent the kind of
studied compromise that a large and successful organization must make to
stave off schism or disintegration. And it does take a certain courage to
28.
29.
30.

Id. (quoting BOY SCOUTS OFAMERICA, THE BOY SCOUT HANDBOOK 551 (10th ed. 1990)).
Id. at 1203 (quoting Scoutmaster training manual).
Id. (quoting BoY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, THE BOY SCOUT HANDBOOK 528 (10th cd. 1990)).
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resist devoted loyalists who want a stronger edge to the organization.
Noncommodifiers should admire the way in which the Scouts has
organized its affairs and they should recognize the dangers of state
intervention that would force the Scouts to take hard-edged positions.
This same equivocal attitude carries over to the issue of homosexuality. The Boy Scouts is dedicated to the training of young, sometimes
impressionable boys. It takes little imagination to think that the parents of
scouts might well be concerned about the identity of the individuals who
supervise and care for their children. They might even fear an increased
risk of child molestation when these youths would go off on camping trips
with avowed homosexual young men. These anxious parents might not be
assured by argument that these forms of aberrant behavior are unprotected
by the civil rights laws, that they are not likely to occur in the Scout setting,
and that they are subject to harsh punishment after the fact, which serves as
a strong deterrent before the fact.
Taking a stand against homosexuality appears, then, to come at a
relatively low price. It is doubtful that scouting draws much of its
membership from the children of homosexual parents. But we can be
confident that the underlying social reality is far more complex. Many of
the Scout families who are uneasy about homosexual practices-especially
as it relates to their own children-do not regard themselves as bigoted or
prejudiced, just worried, troubled, and confused. That population will not
take kindly to strong declarations that overstate the level of their uneasiness
and force them to publicly defend strident anti-gay and lesbian positions to
which they cannot give full-throated endorsement.
Such members,
however, may be able to identify activities that they are prepared to tolerate
at a distance but that they would not wish to see or condone close at home.
In order to hold their complex coalition together, it may make sense for the
Boy Scouts to gravitate toward a compromise that proves more stable in
practice than coherent in theory. Go soft on the formal and explicit
denunciations of gay practices, but nonetheless keep those practices out of
the Scout troops in order to meet these parental demands. That position of
course will cause it to lose some hard-line members who will migrate to
fringe organizations that take harder lines against homosexual behavior.
But that limited exodus from the Scouts has the virtue of reducing the span
of opinions within the Scouts so as to ease its internal governance position.
Muddling through has real benefits.
If I have read the tea leaves correctly, it is no surprise that the Boy
Scouts refused to take a hard line against homosexuality in the abstract, and
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chose not to voice all the fears and concerns of its membership either in its
officially prepared written materials or in the course of litigation. The
Supreme Court dissenters and the New Jersey Supreme Court went to great
lengths to castigate the Scouts for lacking the courage of its ostensible
principles. If it had its way, the Scouts' studied equivocation and
retrenchment would have set it up for the judicial coup de grace. The
group that does not care about its beliefs enough to take extreme positions
cannot prevail in a contest with a state nondiscrimination imperative that
does not show similar equivocation and restraint. The New Jersey
Supreme Court did not have to break a sweat in order to show that the
Scouts apparently lacks the courage of its own convictions in its refusal to
make explicit its apparent belief in the immorality of homosexual behavior.
And Justice Stevens took up the party line when he lamented: "In light of
[the Scouts'] self-proclaimed ecumenism, furthermore, it is even more
difficult to discern any shared goals or common moral stance on
homosexuality."'" In his brief opinion, Justice Souter echoed the same
theme: "[N]o group can claim a right of expressive association without
identifying a clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal
32
way."
Nothing could be more destructive of the rights of expressive freedom
than these ill-considered statements. It is a first-class blunder to think that
moderate organizations really do not object to external discipline and thus
can be cheerfully coerced into doing things against their will. The key
question is this: Why force the Scouts to express a strong, consistent
position from the outset on the immorality of homosexuality in order to
preserve its decisional autonomy? 33 Why should the First Amendment
protect only the extremes of the political distribution, but not the
associational preferences of large, mainstream organizations?
This anomaly is especially odd when set against the background of
First Amendment law generally, which reserves its greatest suspicion for
31. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2462 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2479 (Souter, J., dissenting).
33. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1224 (N.J. 1999). On the price of
equivocation, note that the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
Boy Scouts also points to a 1978 position paper in support of its argument that it
associates for the expressive purpose of advocating the immorality of homosexuality. We
observe that the position paper was not disseminated to Boy Scout members, and decline,
therefore, to view it as representative of the members' shared views.
In addition, Boy Scouts refers to four other position papers, all written after Dale's
expulsion. The self-serving nature of these papers is apparent.

Id at 1224 n.12 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens wrote in a similar vein. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at
2463-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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content-based distinctions. 31 But just those distinctions are invoked when
dissenters in Dale, like the Court in Roberts, look first at the views of the
Scouts or Jaycees directly, and then conclude that their pallid content
means that the statutory limitations on their freedom of association should
count for more than similar restrictions on organizations with more
emphatic, prejudiced, and bigoted views. The obvious incentive is for
organizations to take extreme positions in order to avoid the heavy hand of
state regulation.
Unfortunately, even that chilling option is not available under the
Stevens test. To see why, it is instructive to focus on Justice Stevens'
evasive response to the question raised by the Boy Scouts in its brief:
Could New Jersey amend its Law Against Discrimination to force the Boy
Scouts to admit girls into its ranks, and the Girl Scouts to admit boys? To
his credit, Justice Stevens was obviously troubled by his own fierce loyalty
to the antidiscrimination laws. But in good lawyerly fashion, he refused to
answer this question on principle. Instead he took refuge behind the
procedural point that the New Jersey statute contained an exemption for
"any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably
restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex," including all camps and
bathing facilities. 35 But now suppose that a majority of the New Jersey
Legislature decides that the statute makes sense for baths and toilets, but
not for camps. By Justice Stevens's own test, it looks as though the
separate scout organizations are no more immune from state regulation
than all-boys or all-girls schools. After all, the Boy Scouts does not think
that girls are immoral per se: It is willing to invite them onto its premises
for dances and cooperate with them on nature walks. How then can it
obtain a First Amendment right of association if the state decrees that
integration by sex is the order of the day to prevent, of course, the rampant
sexism that parallel organizations induce in society? That reasonable
minds could differ on this point is for Stevens a reason for the courts to
defer to the legislature. Rightly understood it is the decisive reason for the
legislature to defer to the men and women who run the Scouts. That
Stevens' test demands such odd results should encourage us to reexamine
the basic relationship between freedom of association and the
antidiscrimination principle. Rightly understood, the latter comes out
second best.
34. See e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentRegulation and the FirstAmendm ent, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189 (1983).
35. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2468 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10.512(0).

HeinOnline -- 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 131 2000-2001

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:119

III. FREEDOM AND DISCRIMINATION RECONSTRUCTED
One striking feature of both Roberts and Dale is the ease with which
these opinions hold that the antidiscrimination principle counts as a
compelling state interest that limits the ability of voluntary associations to
determine their own membership. On this count, Justice Stevens repeats
the standard conclusion from Roberts: "We found the State's purpose of
eliminating discrimination is a compelling state interest that is unrelated to
the suppression of ideas." 36 He then picks a refrain of the New Jersey
Supreme Court that the Law Against Discrimination is needed to get rid of
the "cancer" of discrimination. 37 But he offers no explanation of why this
should be that case.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, did take a stab at
explaining why the elimination of discrimination receives its high place in
the constitutional firmament. It led off with the obligatory recitation of
Bradwell v. Illinois, a discredited opinion which held that it was proper for
the state to ban women from the practice of law because of their delicate
condition and out of respect for their natural destiny as wives and
mothers. 38 But at no point did the New Jersey Court note that a legal ban
by the state has very different properties than a private decision by an
individual law firm not to hire a female lawyer for these or any other
reason. So long as the market is open, she can still join some other firm or
indeed start her own practice. The firm is not coterminous with the market.
Some firms may well discriminate against women, but others will
discriminate in their favor. For whatever it is worth, there is probably more
affirmative action to help women (at least at the entry level) than there is
discrimination against them, and it is very hard today to put together any
coherent set of data that points to some system-wide disadvantages that
women suffer under the current system.39 The range of options that are left
open to women (or indeed to men as well) are far greater when they are
spumed by a single firm operating within a competitive industry with free
entry than when a state rule forces them out of the market altogether. The
same conclusion is still more true of gays and lesbians who have notable
36. Id. at 2467 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-26).
37. Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2459 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (echoing the theme of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208).
38. 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). I have addressed this theme at greater length in Richard A. Epstein,
Liberty, Patriarchy,and Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 89, 99-100.
39. For one convenient collection of data, see DIANA FURCHTGOTr-ROTH & CHRISTINE STOLBA,
WOMEN'S FIGURES: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF WOMEN IN AMERICA

(1999).
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success in labor markets, in part because their relative lack of family
entanglements makes it easier for them to focus on their work. Indeed, the
New Jersey Court's evident confusion on this issue was marked by its own
conclusion:
The sad truth is that excluded groups and individuals have been
prevented from full participation in the social, economic, and political

life of our country. The human price of this bigotry has been enomious.
At a most fundamental level, adherence to the principle of equality
demands that our legal system protect the victims of invidious
discrimination. 4
This overbroad proposition conveniently relies on the passive voice
("excluded groups") without stating who does the excluding. It thus
obscures the critical distinction between state and private action. To be
sure, any form of public discrimination that prevents any adult from fully
participating in the social, economic, and political life of our country is
indefensible. But that argument only goes to show that the common
restraints that limited the legal capacity of any individual to vote, to enter
into contracts, to give testimony in court, and otherwise to participate in the
legal system should be removed as quickly as possible.' 1 Here, however,
the New Jersey Supreme Court did not even make an effort to explain what
additional social harms have occurred from the private refusal to deal. Yet
in all these situations, transaction costs between the parties are low, so that
a bargain could be arranged if membership in the organization was worth
more to the individual than exclusion was worth to the organization to
refuse them membership. In practice, we should not hold our breath on this
point because the deep difference in philosophical position probably makes
it impossible for individuals with strong and explicit differences in
worldviews to come together. But in itself that gulf should caution against
allowing one side to impose its will on the other, and encourage us instead
to allow for the efficient self-sorting that only voluntary organizations can
provide. To be sure, there are always social losses that follow from
exclusion, whether we speak of private property or voluntary organizations.
But by the same token it cannot be assumed that rejecting the presumption
in favor of freedom of association improves overall social welfare solely
because it eliminates this one form of social loss. The overall picture is far
more complicated because it must take into account the decline in utility
that current members derive from their affiliation once the rules of
40. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1227 (footnote omitted).
41. I have defended this position in Richard A. Epstein, Two Conceptions of Civil Rights. 8 SOc.
PHiL. & POL'Y 38 (1991).
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admission are altered. Some individuals could be so upset that they
withdraw from the organization; others could decide to remain, but only
with lower levels of satisfaction and involvement. Owing to the subjective
values involved, it is difficult to quantify the relative size of these losses
from the outside. But recognizing these measurement difficulties makes it
all the more important to cut beneath the organizational veneer to recognize
that the interest of the organization consists of some aggregation of the
self-defined interests of its membership. Yet nowhere are the losses from
forced association taken into account in striking the appropriate
constitutional balance.
The New Jersey Court was similarly uninformative in its failure to
give any content to the term "invidious discrimination." Does affirmative
action count as invidious discrimination? Sometimes? Always? In
fudging on the term, that court ignores the possibility that the voluntary
segmentation of the population into groups that have greater internal
coherence may be advantageous for their members. 42 So long as civil
capacity is assured, no individual has to be the victim of discrimination as
each is free to forge private associations that it values. In private markets,
sober and sensitive people can-and do-migrate away from bigots and
zealots. They do not have that exit option in a state-dominated system in
which the strength and worth of various beliefs is decided not by the
parties, but by the courts, who rely on their own stereotypical vision to
decide what forms of discrimination are appropriate and what are not.
Having said all this, the question then arises, is there any reason ever
to recognize antidiscrimination as an offset against the freedom of
association? One possible answer to that question takes refuge in one of
the fine points of First Amendment law, which holds that the Court should
ignore the "incidental" effect that the application of general legal principles
has on the regulated party.43 In this context, the argument might be that an
antidiscrimination law is a general regulation without a content-specific
target, and should therefore be allowed to pass muster in much the same
fashion as the National Labor Relations Act,44 the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 45 the antitrust laws,4 6 or, in at least some contexts, the zoning laws.47
42. For my discussion of this point, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 60-72 (1992).
43. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (allowing promissory
estoppel theory to be brought by informant against newspaper that published information supplied in
confidence).
44. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
45. See, e.g., Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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But in these cases the use of incidental impact adds nothing to the analysis
to show why indirect regulation is more acceptable than direct forms of
content restriction. A restriction on speech, for example, may be justified
consistent with a theory of individual freedom if it is designed to prevent
the occurrence of a nuisance that itself would be actionable if it came to
pass. But in a case such as Dale,it becomes hard, if not impossible, to treat
the formation of a voluntary organization as falling into that category. To
say that the restriction is incidental on speech therefore does not explain
why or how that restriction is consistent with any general theory of
freedom, of which freedom of speech is a part.48
The overall picture, however, is more complex because it is possible
to identify justifications for limitations on freedom of association that do
not rely on conventional, ad hoc explanations of invidious social exclusion.
The basic clue follows from the undisputed point that the
antidiscrimination principle offers one means to control the excesses of
state action. The state that must treat A in the same fashion as B loses the
ability to single out one person for special treatment. As applied to
coercive state action, the antidiscrimination principle helps counteract the
actions of factions to shift wealth and opportunities around from one group
of individuals to another. The most obvious risk of government misbehavior is the outright confiscation of the property of A which is then
transferred over to B. But a system of state regulation could achieve that
same result by imposing burdens solely on the A's of the world for the
exclusive benefit of the B's. Indeed, frequently the state may craft rules
that look formally neutral, but that have disparate impact upon members of
different groups. A rule that requires uniform premiums for medical
insurance regardless of age transfers wealth from the young to the old even
if the contractual terms of coverage are identical for all required enrollees.
Some judicial counterweight, whether we call it takings or substantive due
process, becomes a sensible corrective for a dangerous tendency, even if it
49
introduces some risks of its own.
46.

See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).

47. See e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,73 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("I view the case as presenting an example of innovative land-use regulation, implicating First
Amendment concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent.").
48. For a longer discussion of this point, see Richard A. Epstein. Privacy, Publication,and the
FirstAmendment: The Dangersof FirstAmendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L REV. 1003, 1023-32

(2000).
49. For an able, historical defense of substantive due process, see James W. Ely. Jr., The
Oxymoron Reconsidered. Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Co.ST.
COMMENTARY 315 (1999).
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It would be a serious mistake to assume that only public bodies fall
prey to the dangers of factionalism and favoritism. Private monopolies
create a similar source of danger by creating the opportunity to distinguish
between the services rendered and the prices demanded from different
classes of customers. The regulation of common carriers, which include
both transportation and communication carriers, starts from the premise
that any private firm with a legal or de facto monopoly could engage in
pricing or business practices that deviate from some social optimum.50 The
impulses for regulation in this context are two. First, the economic dangers
of monopoly are easy to document in theory. The quantity of goods sold
will be lower than in a competitive market, but the price charged per unit
will be higher. As price exceeds marginal costs, there is good reason to
believe that the monopolist not only secures a transfer of wealth from
customers to himself, but also reduces the total amount of social welfare.
A system of regulation that stops these practices may help to improve
social welfare. Accordingly, a duty of nondiscrimination is one weapon in
the arsenal to control the behavior of these firms. 5 1 Because the individual
customer has no other place to turn, our legal tradition has long stated that a
common carrier cannot refuse individuals services without cause. If
exclusion is not possible, then the firm cannot be allowed to charge
whatever rates it sees fit to some segments of the markets who are willing
to pay more for products and services of identical prices. Hence, long
before the rise of the modem antidiscrimination principle, it was
understood that common carriers could not draw arbitrary price distinctions
between customers of a given class. Exactly how this normative command
is put into practice is not our concern here. Suffice it to say that the legal
regimes have often fallen short of the conceptual ideal, which would be to
make the monopolist behave as though it were in a competitive industry.
In the present context, a second point reinforces the weakness of the
case for applying the monopoly model to the Boy Scouts. Regulated
50. The lineage is long. See, for example, Allnutt v. Inglis, 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1810),
which relied on the earlier writing of Sir Matthew Hale. For the confused transfer to the United States,
see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). For my analysis of the matter, see EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at
286-89.
51. See H.W. Chaplin, Limitations Upon the Right of Withdrawalfrom Public Employment, 16
HARV. L. REv. 555,556-57 (1903).
Underlying the entire law of carriers, from the Year Books down to the present day, are three
fundamental duties: first, to carry for any member of the public at all times and not merely
when the carrier is so disposed; second, to give to each applicant exactly the same terms and
accommodations as are given to every other under the same circumstances; third, to perform
the services of the carrier's employment at reasonable rates.
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industries typically supply standard commodities-electrical power,
telephone service, railroad transportation-and only work because the firm
is largely indifferent to the identity and personal characteristics of its
customers. No one looks to the power company for the moral development
of the child, and no one thinks that the individuated provision of energy
offers any long-term social good. The apparent need for regulation is
matched with the sensible possibility for regulation. Yet once the
traditional class of common carriers is expanded to cover the exhaustive
statutory list of "places of public accommodation," then the law seeks to
regulate the provision of sensitive goods and services that are not close to
fungible commodities. Camps and schools, for example, do not supply
standardized services to passive consumers whose main task is to sit in a
seat or to munch a sandwich. Individuation and moral development are key
for these organizations, and therefore the model of the inn or the common
carrier on the King's Highway provides a very poor precedent.
This statement of these two constraints indicates just how far removed
the Boy Scouts is from the appropriate use of the antidiscrimination
principle. First, as argued earlier, the Boy Scouts does not have monopoly
power. To be sure, the Scouts is a large organization with millions of
members. But it has no ability to restrict any other private organization
with either a religious or a secular orientation from entering into the market
of providing programs that allow young people to navigate the bumpy road
to maturity. Overtly religious organizations are, for example, actively
involved in this business, as are all sorts of community groups. In line with
general antitrust theory, size should not be regarded as tantamount to a
monopoly power. The ACLU or the New York Tines could, if it chose,
decide to enter into the business directly with its chosen norms for
membership. The politically correct do not have to sit on the sidelines
while the Scouts advances its agenda.
Indeed the concern with monopoly, far from bolstering the
antidiscrimination norm to private competitive firms, cuts precisely in the
opposite direction. Justice Stevens makes much of the point that the Scouts
has prized diversity and broad representation within its ranks. 52 Diversity
looks like the negation of monopoly power. But diversity is exactly what a
nondiscrimination law thwarts. Make no mistake about it, when the state
commands that no person or private organization shall discriminate on the
basis of X, it has imposed a uniform, monopoly position on how all private
52. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2462-63 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of Anicus
Curiae Deans of Divinity Schools and Rabbinical Institutions at 8).
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The control of many diverse
organizations should be organized.
organizations is necessarily ceded in part to the state by the imposition of
the antidiscrimination laws. Let the members of the organization decide
that X is a bad role model for whatever reason, and their decision is now
overridden by the state on the strength of a general pronouncement that has
never been tested in the particular context to which it is now applied. The
Hayekian insight about the importance of "local knowledge" holds as true
in charitable and voluntary organizations as it does in firms. 5 Indeed, if
anything the case is even stronger in this context, for in the absence of any
obvious profit-maximizing metric, all sorts of subtle social and behavioral
issues will determine organizational success and these factors are utterly
beyond the power of the state with its "one-size-fits-all" regime to control.
It might well be argued in reply that a given organization is better off
because of the diverse nature of its membership. In many cases that will be
true, but presumably those who are in charge of its internal operation can
make that decision for themselves without the benevolent intervention of
the state. Once, however, the state sets the policy of what counts as
appropriate grounds for the exclusion of this individual from that group,
then this mandated diversity within organizations necessarily reduces
diversity across organizations. The full range of private options is now
displaced by a state monopoly--one that cannot be justified by the need to
constrain private monopoly forces. No longer is it possible to establish a
new all-boys or all-girls school or college; nor is it possible for parents to
pick between rival scouting organizations, one of which will admit gay
troop leaders into its ranks and another that will exclude them. The
regulatory costs imposed are not limited to the countless individuals who
must yield to a state-monopoly in determining the governance and
In addition, the public
membership in their private organizations.
be a correct answer)
cannot
(a
"cancer"
true
answer
the
one,
insistence on
to matters of social organization necessarily cuts off society-at-large from
valuable information as to which kinds of organizations succeed with
which constituencies and why. Competition and experimentation are
thereby suppressed.
With all this said, the proper legal regime should run as follows. The
initial rule allows all private organizations the power to select their own
members and to set their own rules. All that dissenters should have is the
exit option if their voice fails to persuade the organization to move in some
53. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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desired direction. The rationale for this principle follows the general
rationale for any exercise of the principle of freedom of contract. The
values expressed by the contracting parties have an inescapable subjective
component that makes it wholly improper for outsiders to attach values and
weights to the goals and aspirations of the parties for regulatory purposes.
For its part, the antidiscrimination norm should be applied at most as a
counterweight to monopoly in standardized markets when potential
customers of a business have no alternative place to go.
IV. THE PROTECTION OF NONEXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS:
OF PROPERTY AND DUE PROCESS
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion should be commended insofar as it
resists, on First Amendment grounds, the application of the antidiscrimination laws to expressive associations such as the Boy Scouts. But the
question immediately arises whether it makes any sense to limit this
protection to expressive associations, or whether it should be extended in
principle to all associations generally. As matters now stand, the
expressive/nonexpressive- (or in other cases the intimate/nonintimate-)
association line is invoked to police a constitutional chasm. Let an
association be expressive or intimate, and a high level of state justification
is needed for its regulation-higher for Rehnqulst than for Stevens. But let
it be an ordinary economic association, and state regulation in derogation
of property and economic liberties proceeds without pause. Only the bold
and foolhardy would claim that current law allows business associations,
large or small, public or private, out from under the thumb of the
antidiscrimination laws.
That said, this ostensible divide cannot be defended on either political
theory or constitutional law grounds. If the reasoning underlying Dale is
applied correctly, then Title VII is flatly unconstitutional on three
interrelated grounds: It violates the basic conceptions of liberty, property,
and speech, all in a single blow. One clear caution sign is that the line
between expressive and nonexpressive organizations does not leap out.
The core illustration of a nonexpressive organization has to be the profitmaking corporation that ships goods, provides services, and cares only for
its bottom line. But it is sheer fantasy to assume that any successful
organization fits this odd caricature of the firm, and is wholly indifferent to
how it is perceived in the external world or by its own staff. It is
commonplace to speak of "corporate cultures" and to understand that these
refer to the way in which particular firms position themselves in the many
markets, internal and external, in which they do business. Firms are
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acutely aware of the importance of maintaining good employee and
community relationships, and this in turn will influence the ways in which
firms will seek to engage its members in voluntary community activities. It
makes a huge difference whether a large firm confines its gifts to secular
organizations or whether it offers financial support or personal assistance to
churches, or for that matter the Boy Scouts once it has reaffirmed its
determination to exclude gay members from its ranks. The decision
whether or not to boycott South Africa before the end of apartheid, to
refuse to permit smoking on the job, to voluntarily clean up a dumpsite, or
to promote fat-free food all contain a strong expressive dimension. A
business firm that refuses to hire workers that have criminal records, or
who lack certain religious affiliations, also makes a statement as to how it
views itself.
The list goes on and on. If the First Amendment applies, as Rehnquist
insists, so long as the organization "merely engage[s] in expressive activity
that could be impaired, ''54 then it follows that every organization engages in
expressive activity when it projects itself to its own members and to the rest
of the world. The theory of "social meaning," as it were, assumes a
constitutional significance that may not be welcomed by its champions.
Alternatively, if it is urged that some less-generous reading of expressive
behavior is appropriate, then we can ask first how this test is to be
formulated, and next how it applies to the literally thousands of
organizations that engage in business, charitable, religious, or recreational
endeavors, or some mixture thereof. To take but one illustration among
many, does a religious university have protection against the
antidiscrimination laws in the choice of its faculty and its employees? If
so, when its internal conception requires that everyone from the President
to the janitor partake in morning prayers, does the First Amendment permit
it to exclude nonbelievers from its ranks? If this option is given to
religious organizations, can it be denied to an institution that is dedicated to
diversity and gender equity? The short, unhappy truth is that the phrase
"expressive association" does not function well as a term of exclusion.
Quite simply, it cannot bear the weight that is thrown onto its fragile
shoulders. It is not the byproduct of any general theory. It came into use,
purely and simply, on the ground that the associational right is derived
from the free speech right, and from the free speech right alone.
Yet this point cries out for a response. What the Boy Scouts sought
was the right to exclude certain individuals not only from their ranks, but
54.

Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
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from their facilities. That right to exclude resonates, however, at least as
well with the right to property and the rights of liberty generally as it does
with the right to speech. After all, the Supreme Court has reminded us on
countless occasions that the essence of private property is the right to
exclude, 55 and surely that right is necessarily implicated when an
association (which holds property in common) wishes to exclude someone
from participating in activities that take place on its premises.
Likewise, the Due Process Clause protects the life, liberty, and
property of all individuals. Here I think that a good case can be made for
the principle of substantive due process. I shall not argue that point here,
except to say that it does not seem necessary to hold that the process in
question simply refers to the procedures on such matters as bias and notice
that courts invoke to try individual cases, but also extends to cover the rules
that legislatures fashion for the trial of individual cases. If the legislature
cannot manipulate burdens of proof without restraint, then surely it does
not supply due process when it conclusively presumes that individuals owe
money whether or not they have borrowed it, or that individuals do not own
property even though they have occupied or purchased it. Indeed, it is
worth remembering that the protection afforded for educational liberties in
Meyer v. Nebraska56 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters5 7 both stemmed from
the Due Process Clause and not from the emanations or penumbras of the
First Amendment.58 At this point, it follows that we can put together a
55.

See e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,433 (1932); Kaiser

Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).

The Court equivocated on the strength of its

convictions in PrneyardShopping Cr. v.Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), when itrefused to allow the
exclusion of demonstrators who claimed a First Amendment right to protest in the Pruncyard Shopping
Center. For my criticism, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of
PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 41 (1997). The position that the Fist Amendment guarantee

on speech operates against the Fifth Amendment guarantee against takings shows a major
misunderstanding of both, which reminds me of the old Archie joke:
Jughead: Archie, do you believe in free speech?

Archie: Sure, Jughead.
Jughead. Then you won't mind me using your phone for a long distance call!

56.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

57. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
58. Professor Tribe notes:
At the height of the Lochner era, this limitation on state power was found to derive from the
"liberty" guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, with particular

emphasis upon the teacher's liberty to pursue a vocation and the liberty of parents and the
school of their choice to conclude a contract for the education of their children.
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1318 (footnote omitted). Tribe places the word "liberty" in scare quotations to

hint that its use is somewhat illegitimate. But it is not given that liberty includes at the very least the
right to enter into all lawful callings, i.e., those that do not pose the threat of force or fraud against
another human being. What is instructive about both Meyer and Pierce is how they integrate the
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single harmonious theory which allows three clauses of the Constitution to
work in the sort of intellectual harmony that even Ronald Dworkin in his
search for the best moral theory could praise. I see no reason why we
should try to carve up the constitutional universe to undercut the obvious
intellectual unity of the common law rules that treat private property,
freedom of contract, and freedom of speech as being cut from the same
cloth. That decision, of course, leaves the state free to regulate property
and contract on the familiar police power grounds including the control of
monopoly behavior that sometimes applies within the free speech area, as
with access to telephone lines. A broad protection of associational
freedom-one which sees it as derivative of property, contract, and
speech-should be praised for facilitating a proliferation of private
voluntary organizations, so that those who are excluded from some can
gain entry into others. The relative balance between exclusion and
inclusion does not shift as we move from expressive to nonexpressive
categories, assuming that we can draw an intelligible line between them.
That said, the strength of Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion only
reveals the indefensible nature of the two-tier constitutional system he
implicitly accepted. No theory of associational freedom that places speech
on a pedestal and leaves other forms of collective behavior to the tender
mercies of the state can endure. Someone might reply that this calls for the
constitutional invalidation of much of the Civil Rights Act, including Title
VII insofar as it relates to employment. And so, thankfully, it does. But
before we gnash our teeth at that conclusion, it should also be noted that
this position does nothing to prevent voluntary affirmative action (freed of
the threat of civil rights actions) in the private sector, and may well allow
(as I would argue) that limited race- and sex-conscious decisions could be
made in the public sphere as well.
To state the position in this form is, of course, to open myself to the
charge that the decision in Dale should be condemned for what has become
the most compelling of reasons: that it introduces through a First
Amendment backdoor the now-discredited doctrine of Lochner v. New
York,59 which countenanced a wide-spread usurpation of power by
economic with the personal and the spiritual. Liberty is an indivisible concept, and should be treated as
such by the courts. And remember it was Justice McReynolds who wrote:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (citations omitted).
59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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unelected and unaccountable judges who themselves are utterly unable to
evaluate the competing interest's involved in any complicated legislative
scheme. 60 That point might have force if it were utterly impossible to
develop a comprehensive theory to explain which conditions do and do not
override the presumption in favor of liberty established under the First
Amendment. But if the critics of Lochner were correct, then they would
have to explain why the entire edifice of First Amendment law should not
be undone as well, for it too requires judges to make difficult judgments
about the complex legislative schemes that govern, for example, the
complex area of telecommunications. But on balance the intervention has
proven successful in the preservation of limited government even if
occasional mistakes mar the overall performance.
I have no doubt that the same overall interpretive structure that applies
to the First Amendment carries over to the other substantive provisions of
the Constitution, and that judges who work to understand the theory vill be
more likely to get it right than judges who think that the rational basis
standard of review is sufficient reason for them to take off their thinking
caps during any constitutional argument. These weighty issues of institutional competence are, of course, not unique to Dale, but pop up in any
discussion of judicial review. Their final resolution awaits another time
and day. For the moment it is quite sufficient to point out that Boy Scouts
ofAmerica v. Dale rightly opens Pandora's Box. The case is not just about
whether the Boy Scouts can refuse to admit homosexuals into its ranks. It
is really about whether the antidiscrimination norm can trump the norm of
free association. Most of the time it cannot, and it should not, both as a
matter of political and of constitutional theory.
60. Even some thoughtful detractors of Locimer do not challenge its broad definition of liberty.
but claim instead that it is wise to use a deferential standard of review "in testing whether alleged

infringements of economic liberties are justifiable." GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN.
CONSTITrTIONAL LAW 467 (13th ed. 1997). But there is no intellectual coherence in announcing a

grand prima facie case which can then be engulfed by trivial exceptions.
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